

# THE APHORISMS OF THE MIMANSA PHILOSOPHY BY JAIMINI

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Jaimini







## THE APHORISMS

OF THE

## MÍMÁNSÀ PHILOSOPHY

BY

JAIMINI.

WITH

EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARIES.

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IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

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THE APHÖRISMS  
OF  
THE MIMĀNSĀ.

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH.

PART I.

## PREFACE.

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The great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of men to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninitiated, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with as much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pundits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of those men, and, through them, of other learned Brahmins, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

J. R. B.

Benares College,  
31st July, 1881.      }

## THE MIMĀNSĀ APHORISMS.

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### INTRODUCTION.

a. Suspicion is the first of the *mimānsā* preceptor !\*

b. Veneration increasingly be to Jaimini, who removes the doubt of visitors of the temple by the oily-thera-needle of his Institute which put an end to doubt as to the sense of scripture.†

c. Now a doubt being started as to whether or not Jaimini ought to have undertaken this work, which consists of twelve lectures,—and the prior fact, solution of the doubt being as follows—viz.—such a work of disquisition ought not to be undertaken, because a work of disquisition is of no use when Heaven (*svarga*) is obtained by the mere taking of the letters [of the Pada without regard to its sense]. Heaven alone being [in this case] to be supposed the fruit, as it is in the case of the sacrifice called *agnihotri* [—mentioned in the 4th stanza of the *Bṛaghamāṇī*—], it being to be expected that there is none that attacked

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\* अपि गुरुव्याप्तिः स्मृतः ॥

† विद्यार्थीश्चाप्यनुवादाकालस्यात्मकम् । मूलाच्छुर्वद-  
ष्टेष्वेन स्मृतिमित्युपनिषद् ॥

to the person engaged in the direction 'The Veda is to be perused' [—and Hesma being most probably the fruit when no other fruit is specified]—well, this *primal* *fact* solution of the doubt having generated itself, he declares the established truth [in regard to the point, as follows].

## BOOK I. CHAPTER I.

### SECTION I.

Or Dvay.

**वायाति विशिष्टाम् ॥ १ ॥**

Aph. I.—Next, therefore, [O reader] that hast attained thus far] a desire to know Duty (dharma) [is to be entertained by thee].

a. 'Next'—i. e. after perusing the scriptures whilst residing with the family of a preceptor;†

b. 'Therefore'—i. e. because the fruit of the perusal of the scriptures is the knowledge of the veda [of its several passages,

\* वाय द्वाह वायावानां वाक्प्रारम्भीयं वयेति सद्यते ।  
वायादो उच्चेत्य इति विशिष्टाभ्यनन्ता वाक्प्रारम्भां विश-  
िष्टायैव सुर्वे एव एषां कल्पते । तथावायरव्यावायमावेर  
सुर्वेति॑ । विशिष्टाभ्यन्ताकिञ्चित्प्रव्याप्ति॒ विशिष्टाभ्यन्तां वाक-  
प्रारम्भीयमिति॑ पूर्वेषै शिहालमाह ।

† वयेति॑ । अत गुरुकृतवायपूर्वे क्वन्तो हृष्णामानन्तरम् ।

without comprehensive apprehension of the import of its teaching—see Letters on the Vedanta [6]; therefore, in respect of Duty, the definition of which will be stated [in Aph. 2.], “a desire to know”—i. e. an investigation originating in a desire of knowledge—is to be made;—such is the remainder\* [required to supply the ellipsis in the spherism].

a. The state of the case is this, that naturally the work of disquisition ought to be undertaken, because such a work of disquisition is just subserved by [or has a foundation laid for it in] that knowledge of the sense [of the several passages of scripture, that may be attained by a perusal thereof], and because it is fit that what is effected by a perusal thereof should be a correct understanding of the sense thereof (—instead of Heaven's being attained thereby, as supposed by the speculator in Intro. c.) seeing that it is improper to imagine an *aswes* arrived [of this or that action] when a similar reward is possible;† (—and the understanding of the sense of scripture is a manifest reward of its perusal, whilst the attainment of Heaven by the perusal of scripture is what no one can declare that he has ever found manifested by the sense).

d. As the question will occur—“What is the Duty spoken of, in the expression ‘a desire to know Duty’, in the preceding

\* यतः । यतोऽप्यकर्मसु कर्त्तव्यं ज्ञानं । यतो भौम्या  
वद्यमाणाकर्मसु विज्ञानः । ज्ञानेष्वाप्ताच्च विचारः ।  
कर्त्तव्येति शेषः ।

† यज्ञस्त्वाचः । यज्ञादति राहुकले यज्ञादत्त्वाद्यन्तमनुच्छ-  
तमित्यप्यवेद लघुर्विद्यमसमादृशम् । चित्तादृशमस्य वि-  
ज्ञानासाधीश्वरादिहृषी विद्यायाकर्त्तव्यमन्यादीयमिति ।

spection,<sup>17</sup>—in order to acquaint us with the nature of Duty, he mentions its characteristic mark as follows<sup>18</sup>:

चोदनालक्षणं गुणं भवति ॥ १ ॥

How Duty is to ApA. 2.—A matter that is a Duty is recognisable by its *instigatory character* [of the passage of scripture in which it is mentioned].

a. 'Instigatory character' [of the passage]:—this means [that the criterion of Duty is] an expression that moves [or instigates] one† (to do so and so).

b. 'Is recognised'—i. e. is known thereby;—as fire is recognised by smoke, so that the smoke is the mark whereby fire [though unseen] is known [to be present where the smoke takes its rise]; in like manner an instigatory form of expression is the mark by which we recognise Duty. So Duty is that, the criterion, or the instrument [i.e. the determination], of which, is an instigatory form of expression.‡

*But especially* a. And what constitutes say thing such a *meatless* Duty. matter [i. e. a matter that is fit to be urged in

\* पूर्वस्मृते भर्त्यजित्यासेवय को भवति दृष्टि जित्यासार्थी चोदनालक्षणात्य लक्षणमात्र ।

† चोदनेति प्रवर्त्तकगत्यनाम ।

‡ लक्षणे लक्षणे लक्षणेति लक्षणं । यथा धूमेन्द्रियं कीर्त्तने दृष्टि विज्ञाने लक्षणाभ्युपः । तदन् भर्त्यस्मृते लक्षणं चोदना । चतुर्थ्य चोदनेति लक्षणं यस्मा ।

scripture as a Duty] is the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure\* [—i. e. its being calculated to produce more pleasure than pain].

*d.* And by this [mention, apb. 2, of the mark whereby Duty is to be recognised], it is moreover suggested that a Duty is not to be apprehended by the senses or by any thing else besides the *instructive character* [of a passage in scripture].

*e.* But now [you may ask], "Since, according to [the lexicon called] the *Motilal Kois*, 'The word dharma should be masculine when it means merit, but when it means sacrifice, &c., it is held to be neuter,' how is the word dharma masculine in the aphorism where it means the *Ayurveda*, marriage and others [which are recognized as matters of Duty by the instructing processes attached to their performance]?"—if you ask this,—then take [and be content with] as the reason thereof the fact that he [Tatpurush] is a great sanctified sage; [—and therefore entitled to give the word what gender he pleases. See the *Vaisesika Aphorisms* No. 7. 4].

*f.* In the foregoing aphorism [33.] it was indicated that the cause of [our correctly recognizing] a Duty was simply an inhi-

\* अर्थात् यद्युत्तमिकादृष्टाभवत्तमः ॥

† This definition of dharma may be compared with the Buddhist definition of the word:

‡ इतेन चेतनातिरिक्तेन्द्रियादिगम्भूतं खलेषु नेत्रपि  
क्षितम् ॥

६ एव ! कहाँ पुणि भौः साल् जीवे यागादिके मत  
कृति सेविनीकोशात् । चक्रिहेतादिवाचकर्त्तव्यन्वय सुखे  
पुरुषों कायविति चेतार्थास्मेव वीजमिति गृष्णा ॥

gation (in the shape of a passage of scripture holding out reward for its performance), but not any other evidence such as that of the senses, &c. Since it is impossible that the doubt, as to whether other evidences do enter into the case or not, should be removed without examination, he proposes the examination chapter\* [as follows].

### तत्त्व विविधारणः ॥ ३ ॥

*The object of Duty discussed.* Aph. 3.—An examination of the cause of [our recognizing] it [—viz. Duty,— is to be made.]

a. 'OF IT',—i. e. of a knowledge of the truth—the object [in respect of which that knowledge is wanted] being Duty. 'The cause',—i. e. the means. 'An examination' thereof,—i. e. a disquisition, a discussion, through decisive contradictions [of the opposite opinion—see the Nyaya Aphorisms No. 39—] preceded by arguments [in support of the position laid down:—such an examination] is to be made,—such is the remainder [enclined to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism].

4. ([In the following aphorism] he explains the sentence that he made\* [in Aph. 3].

\* अस्मि चाहयेष मिमिति ननु प्रवचारीतरप्रमाणानीति  
पूर्वस्थेष चापितः। एतत्प्रमाणाति तत्प्रमाणित्वात् तत्परीक्षा मति-  
आनीते ॥

† तत्परीक्षा । तत्प्रमाणित्वात् तत्परानस्ति । मिमिति ।  
कर्त्तव्य । तत्प्रमाणित्वा । परीक्षा । शुक्रियूर्ध्वप्रमाणात् कृ-  
ष्णिकर्त्तव्य । कर्त्तव्येति चेतः ॥

## सत्यमवेदे पुरुषस्त्रियाणि शुद्धिन्यं सत्याकृतिं गिरि विद्यालोपलक्षणं ॥ ३ ॥

*Duty not an object of our perception.* qd. 4. When a man's organs of sense are rightly applied to something extent, that birth of knowledge (which then takes place) is Perception,—(and this Perception is) not the cause [of our recognising Duty—see § 3—] because [the organs of sense are adapted only to] the apprehension of what is (then and there) existent (—which an act of Duty is not.)

a. 'When rightly applied to something extent' i.e. [(That is to say)—when a man's organs of sense are 'rightly applied to', or brought into contact with, 'something extent'; i. e. some object (then and there) existing, what 'birth of knowledge', or of intellection, takes place, is (what we call) Perception :—and such Perception is 'not the cause', i. e. not the producer, of a knowledge of Duty :—that is to say—the organs of sense, which are the means of arriving at the truths of perception, do not [of themselves] enable us to arrive at the truth in respect of Duty.]

b. Of this [—viz. that the senses are not the means of our discerning Duty—] he mentions the reason [—when he says—in § 4—] 'because the apprehension of what is existent'; that is to

\* अतिरूपज्ञेयार्थं विश्वदयति ।

+ सत्यमवेदे चलि । पुरुषस्त्रियाणि । चलि । विद्या-  
मार्थे विद्यते । सत्यमवेदे । चलोमे चलि । चल् शुद्धता ।  
शुद्धता । चल् तत्त्वादर्थ । ईरुश मात्रां चर्मस्त्राव चलि-  
गिरि । गोपादर्थ । मात्राचर्मस्त्राव वर्मीभूतादीन्द्रियाणि चर्म-  
प्रसादं ग साधनस्त्रीति भाष्यः ॥

say—because, by means of the organs of sense there is the apprehension of 'what is absent', i. e. of some thing [then and there] present;—and since Duty [—in the shape, suppose, of the performance of sacrifice—] is not present at the time of our knowing it [to be a Duty to perform the sacrifice,—] it is not adapted to the organs of sense.\*

*The being an object of non-perception, Duty is not to be recognised by inference from such perception.*

leg., or Conjecture (see Wilson's *Sabbath Ethics* p. 21.—) which over their birth throats—during their rest in Perception—can be the cause thereof. Therefore it is a settled point that the characteristic of Duty [—or that whereby we are to recognise it—] as declared in *Apk. 2.*—] is the insigntient [of the passage in scripture where some act is mentioned as being intended to lead to such and such consequences].

*The doubt whether the evidence in favour of a Duty may not be fallacious is that of the reason.*

between the two is one derived by man—existing, as it does, of the suggestions which man has derived,—therefore, as man's knowledge widens away from truth in respect of another of

\* तत्त्वं चेतुमात्रं । विद्यमालोपलक्ष्यात् । विद्यमालक्ष्य ।  
वर्तमानस्तीति च सुनः । तद्विद्येष्वपलक्ष्यात् । चर्मस्तथा छान-  
कानो चाहस्तीते तद्विद्यापोष्यादिति भावः ।

† दद्विद्यात्त्वात्त्विमत्त्वग्निरस्तीते तत्त्वस्त्वपलक्ष्यात्त्वक-  
त्वात्त्विद्यात्त्वग्निरस्तीते तद्विद्यित्वग्नि निरस्त्वात्त्वग्निरस्तीते ।  
कर्त्तव्याद्वामात्त्वग्निरस्तीते चर्मस्तथा भित्ति विद्यम् ।

pearl or the like [when it mistakes them for silver or the like], no other language, as it is dependent on man's knowledge as it has reference to the knowledge of a connection which was desired by man, is liable to part company with veracity in matters of declaration, the *intuitional* nature [of a passage which, being in words, is liable to be misinterpreted,] cannot be the instrument of correct knowledge in respect of Duty"—well, this *prima facie* view of the matter having presented itself, he declares the established doctrine as follows:—

कृतप्रियम् यज्ञस्यादेव सामधनम् ज्ञानम् पदे ते।  
यज्ञतिरेकाद्यादेव नुपर्यादे तप्तस्यादे वादरात्रयस्यादपे।  
ताप्तात् ॥ ५ ॥

*Reply*—that the *word* does not *of itself* *justify the evidence of Scripture*

*AjA. S.*—But the natural connection of a word with its sense is [the instrument of] the knowledge thereof; [i.e., of Duty], and the intimation [of Scripture which is] occurring though given in respect of something imperceptible. This [according to our opinion as well as that] of Bāṇadevaya [the author of the Vedic Aphorisms] is the evidence [by means of which we recognise Duty], for it has no respect [to any other evidence—such as that of sense].

a. "Of a word," i.e., of an expression that is a constituent

\* यज्ञाद्योहन्यवन्नादे पुरुषेषां कल्पितमहोत्तमम्-  
सम्भवम् कल्पितलाल्पुत्रपकल्पितसम्भवानापेचताऽच-  
ल्पम् यथा प्रायशङ्कादे शुक्रिकादी सत्यले अभिवरणि तथा  
पुरुषाधीनस्तेषु गान्धोऽपि मत्तावद्यज्ञित्वादसम्भवात् एते  
वोदना इमान्मिति पूर्वपक्षे चिह्नान्मात्रः ॥

part of the everlasting Veda;—such as—" He that dearest Paradise should solemnise the Agnibhûta sacrifice," &c.<sup>4</sup>

a. "With its *meaning*—i. e. with the meaning which is to be conveyed by this or that† [word].

b. " Connection"—in the shape of power] (or of God's will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning).

c. " Natural"—i. e. inherent,—in short, *eternal*;

d. These [i. e. from the eternal connection of a word with its sense] in the knowledge 'thereof'—i. e. of Duty. Here [i. e. in the word-jñâna] the affix *ayam* conveys the force of the 'instrument',—so that the word signifies the instrument of knowledge or of right understanding.]

*An objector, finding* *ayam* *the instrument* *of* *certainty* *to be* *non-existent*. *f.* But then [some one may ask]—" since it is notorious in the world that, after hearing the expression 'In' [—e. g. a mountain—] a *erry*',—having seen, with the organ of sense, the fire [assumed to be, e. g., in the mountain], we then admit [—what one was not prepared to admit before subjecting the matter, on some occasion or other, to the test of the sense]—that matter of testimony is [or may be] matter of right knowledge

\* यदस्मि । निष्पत्तेद्वरकपदम् । चाप्तिकार्त्तुष्ट्राण्गी-  
काम दृश्याद् ॥

† अर्थात् । लभाप्तिपाप्तार्थः ॥

‡ वास्तवः । गतिकृपः ॥

§ वायविकः । व्याख्यिकः । निष्प दृश्य यात् ॥

|| वास्तवः । धर्मः । वात् । कल्प करणे व्युट् ।  
चाप्तिकार्त्तुष्ट्राण्गी करणम् ॥

(—or, in other words, that Testimony may be relied on, seeing that we have found it corroborated by the evidence of the witness)—; since [we say] what is conveyed by Words [or Testimony] has need of other evidence, such as the sense, how can it be this to which we owe our right knowledge of Duty?—It is with an eye to this [anticipated objection] that he says, [in the Aphorism, that the testimony is here the evidence] ‘in respect of something imperceptible’, meaning thereby [that Duty is] something not to be apprehended by means of the sense or any other evidence\* (apart from that specified in §2).

*g. ‘Intimation’—i. e. declaration of a fact.†*

*A. ‘Uncring’—i. e. which is not seen to diverge therefrom; (i. e. from the fact).*

*i. ‘For it has no respect’—i. e. because it has no reference to sense-perception, &c.‡*

*j. ‘This’—i. e. a witness consisting of an injunction—is the evidence (on which rests our knowledge) of Duty;—such is the contentious opinion of *advaita*.§ The drift [of what we*

\* नान् विकल्पनिति यद्यपवयामनादं प्रत्यक्षेषु वर्त्ति इत्यु  
चन्दे प्रमाणं वृद्धानीति लोके प्रसिद्धः प्रत्यक्षादीतरप्रमाण-  
प्राप्येत्याच्छद्यु ए कथं भीष्मं प्रमाणमत आह अनुवाहम  
इति । अनुपलब्दे । प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैरजाते दुष्टः ।

† अपदेशः । अवृपतिवादनक् ।

‡ अव्यतिरेकः । अव्यभिचारी इत्यन्ते चतुः ।

§ अनपेक्षात् । प्रत्यक्षाद्यापेक्षात् ।

[The notion of the name of *advaita* (or *veda*) in the Aphorism goes to prove that *advaita's* work, the *prabhāshikā*, was not intended to give to us the author of the *advaita*-school. Mr. Coleridge's rendering of the terms *prabhā* and others by ‘poor’ and ‘lair’ (—see *Zenya*, vol. 1, pp. 227 and 228)—would seem to have led Dr. Hales to suppose that

have been arguing] is this. The sentence "The mountain is fiery", when enunciated by a man who is delirious [in some of his organs of sense], wanders away from the fact [—for the mountain may seem to such a one to be fiery when it really is not—]; therefore we require to make use of our senses to ascertain whether credence is due [to the testimony of fallible man]:—but the injunction "If that desirous Paradise should recline the *dynamite* sacrifice" comes at any time past present or future is liable thus to wander from the truth; therefore is it, independently of any thing else, the clear evidence of a duty.\*

### SECTION II.

#### ON THE ETERNITY OF SENSE.

The *entity* of *Sense* implies the *entity* of *Sound*. It was stated in the foregoing Aphorism [No. 5] that the connection between a word and its sense is eternal [—see § 8 A]; and since this is dependent on the eternity of *Sound* [—seeing that if *Sound* were not eternal, then words formed of *sound* could not

exist]—it is the earliest in point of time. He says, (in p. 226, vol. IV., of his History of Philosophy,—Marrett's version)—that “*According to Galileo*, the adherents of this school may be divided into the *older* and the *later*”;—and, then he goes on to speak of “the older and younger Vedantists”—but in fact the terms ‘*older*’ and ‘*later*’ refer to the *decrees* of the *Veda* which *Janaka* and *Yajna*, respectively espoused, the latter resuming ‘*older*’ to the *Spirits*, or theological notions, which stand last in order.

“ तत् । विभिन्नताम् । एते प्राप्ताः चादरात्मा चायेष्य चक्षन् । चक्षनाथः । पर्वतो विक्षिप्तिर्लिङ्गो चायुद्धयुलो चक्षते चास्ति विक्षिप्तम् । चक्षते प्राप्ताः प्रियं चक्षतादिक्षमित्यते । तथा ग्रीष्मोच्च चक्षतात्तिर्लिङ्गं चक्षते चक्षतादेत्यस्ति च विक्षिप्तम् । अत चक्षतात्तिर्लिङ्गं एते प्राप्ताः प्रियं ।

be eternal, nor consequently the relation of such to their significations—], he, seeking to demonstrate this, sets forth, in the first place, the grosser view of the question in the shape of the opinion of those who assert that Sound is not eternal.\*

### ४८५ तत्त्व दर्शनम् ॥ ६ ॥

*First objection to the eternity of Sound, that it is a product.* Apt. 6.—Some say that it [viz. Sound] is a product, for in the case of it we see (what constitutes it such)

a. Some say that it is a product, &c. —'Sound'—i. e., the followers of the Nyaya—say that Sound is a 'product',—i. e., something not eternal; 'for we see'—i. e., we see an effect made; 'in the case of it'—i. e., in the case of Sound; and it is a rule without exception that that is not eternal which effect is concerned in [the existence of]. †

b. Moreover [the Naiyayikas contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reasons]:

### ४८६ तत्त्व दर्शनम् ॥ ७ ॥

*Second objection, that it is transitory.*

Apt. 7.—Because of its transitoriness.

\* यदेष्वचे चक्राद्येत्यस्मिन्नो लिप्य दग्धुन्ति । तत्त्व शब्दं नित्यात्मापैत्तिर्मिति तत्त्वाद्यविद्युरादौ यद्वानित्यात्मादिस्तं पूर्वपद्मपादयति ।

† कर्मेति । इके । नीत्यात्मिका । कर्म नानित्यं शब्दं वदति । तत्त्वं । शब्दविद्युषो । दग्धेनात् । प्रथमदग्धेनात् । अद्विषयः सप्तमः सो दुष्टिय दृष्टिं लाभेत ।

‡ लिप्य ॥

a. "Because of its transitoriness"—i. e. because it is not permanent;—or in other words, because, beyond a moment, it is no longer perceived."

b. Moreover [the Kālakīrti contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reason].

### कर्त्तव्यशब्दात् ॥ ८ ॥

Third objection, that Sound      Aph. 8.—Because [we employ, when  
is created as *instrument* by speaking of Sound,] the expression 'ma-  
king' or 'using' of language.

a. That is to say—because we treat it as something not eternal, inasmuch as we talk of making a sound, just as we talk of making a jar.;

b. And for the following reason also, he maintains, they hold it to be not eternal.)

Fourth objection, that the employed agency of Sound is incompatible with its indestructible quality.

### परमानन्द शीतलशब्दात् ॥ ९ ॥

Aph. 9.—From its simultaneousness in another person.

a. [To complete the sentence] It is necessary to supply 'in another place', when we speak of 'another person'.—so then, we observe 'simultaneousness', i. e. the fact of belonging to one and the same time,—'in another being'—i. e. in the perception of [Sound by] another living creature occupying a different place.]

\* चक्रवाकादचिरलोकं । चण्डूल्लेखनुषस्त्वेनिति आप ।  
† किञ्च ।

‡ अथा एवं कर्त्तव्यशब्दात् तथा यद्युपेक्षितीत्यनिवापक-  
शब्दात् ॥

§ इतीयुपेक्षित्य इत्याच ॥

|| सत्त्वात्मक इति । हेतुलाभ इत्युपेक्षितिः । तथा ॥

a. The scope [of the objection] is this, viz., the unity of Sound will follow from the very same argument by which, for obviousness, its eternity will be established [by the followers of the Mimikshā, —supposing the argument to be admitted]; and thus one [numerically single] thing would be simultaneously perceived by [and hence simultaneously in immediate contact —see Nyāya Aphorism, No. 4—with the sense-organs of] those both near and far—and this could not be if it were [numerically] one and eternal;—therefore [the Nyāyikas conclude] Sound is not eternal and it is plural.\*

b. And for the following reason too [according to the Nyāyikas] it is so [—that Sound is not eternal—], as the author maintains (ii) :—

### प्रस्तुतिविविधाय । ३.० ॥

*With objection, that sounds are liable to perceptual inflection.*

Aph. 10.—And [the Nyāyikas infer that Sound is not eternal, from the observation] of the original and altered forms [of sounds].

a. What is meant by this,—because it holds universally that that is not eternal the previous condition of which undergoes a change; and on the example *ददिष्यते* [i. e. 'with—here']

केचिन्नरे । अन्यदेचक्षुष्टव्याप्तरे । प्राणान्नप्राप्तरे । वीक्षणमेकत्वात्प्रिक्तं हहम् ।

\* कुरुते शब्दः । अथा लाभवादित्यलं तथा तेनैव हेतुना गृह्ण एवावश्यपि गोवक्तव्यः । भवत्यन्तेकस्य वस्तुनस्य निरुद्धविप्रिक्ताप्रयत्नं सुगम्यत्वेत् । वदमेकत्वे विषयते त्रिप्रयत्नः । अतो त्रिप्रयत्नः यत्तेव वाचात्प्रेति ॥

१ कलो द्रुपि तवेत्याह ।

when the original form was dashti svara, there is a change in the shape of the letter *y* in the root of the original letter i.e.

### इदिष्य कर्त्तव्यात् ॥ ११ ॥

*Surely ignorance, that does  
proceed from greater ignorance,  
is responsible for making it.*

Aph. 11.—And, by a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it.

a. For this reason too, if [viz. Sound] is not increased, that 'an augmentation', i. e. an increase, 'of it', i. e. of Sound, is observed (to be caused), 'by a multitude of makers', i. e. by the numberlessness of those who make it. On the other hand, if you assume that human effort is [not the maker but only] the manufacturer of Sound, [—as a lamp is not the maker of a jar but the manufacturer of it—making capable the jar which previously existed unperceived—then we reply, that,] what is manifested is not seen to be made greater even by a thousand manufacturers, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps, [and Sound is made greater by a multitude], therefore [say the Nāyāyikas] the alternative supposition of 'manufacturing' (instead of production) will not answer;—such is the import.

\* इत्येवत्र हृषि अवेति प्रकृतिर्विलोपे प्रकृतिमुत्तेजत-  
स्याने यक्षाद्युपो विकारो भवति । यज्ञः प्रकृतेर्विकारको  
द्विग्रन्थ दृष्टिं लाभेति भावः ।

† कर्त्तव्या । कर्त्तव्यान्वयेन । अस्य । कर्त्तव्य । हृषिः ।  
महात्मे हृषिने चलो त्रुपनिषदः । त्रुपनिषदप्रसाद शब्दव्याप्त-  
कर्त्तव्ये न्यायाकसङ्गतेवापि लौकिका हृषिने हृषिते । यज्ञ  
दीपसङ्गतेवापि यज्ञस्य । चतो यज्ञकलपादो त्रुपनि-  
षदति भावः ॥

The explanation of these objections is undertaken.

b. The several objections thus alleged against the 'manifestation' view [of Sound's coming to be perceived], he proceeds to refute in their order.\*

### सत्त्व तथा दृश्यम् ॥ १९ ॥

*Note for last para.—* See for last para.—that of these objections and of ourselves)

is the perception thereof—[both agreeing that this is only for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to Sound itself's being so.]

a. 'That alike all.' There requires to be supplied [to complete the aphorism] 'for a moment' and 'according to both opinions.' According to 'both opinions,' i. e. according to the opinion that it is produced and the opinion that it is manifested,—'alike,' i. e. without dispute, 'the perception,' i. e. sensation of Sound, is for a moment, i. e. only for a moment.)

b. Though [so far as this point is concerned] they are alike, yet which of the views is the 'best?' To this question the reply is that the 'manifestation' view is the proper one; so he proceeds to say as follows.;

\* एते अल्पकालयोः बहुनि सूषणान्मुक्तानि कलेष परिक्षेप्य उपज्ञाने ।

† समविति । चापमिति मतदृश्य दृतिर्थ पूर्वीय । मतदृश्य । चापमिति चाप्यत दृति मतदृश्ये । चापं । चापमात्रं । दृशीनं । चाप्यपाप्यते । समं । अविवादम् ॥

‡ चापले दृष्टि कलमः पर्यो चरितु दृति इति चाप्यते चाप्यतपर्यो युक्त चापात् ।

## कर्म परमार्थिन विश्वानामात्रम् ॥ १३ ॥

*How Sound reigns over  
things not manifested.*

aph. 13.—Of this [Sound] while it really exists, the non-perception at another time [than that when the sound is perceived] arises from the non-arrival of the manifestor of the object.

a. 'Of this while it really exists' i.e. 'While it really exists,'—i. e. which is at all times extant (whether perceived or not);—'at another time,' i. e. at a time before or after; 'the non-perception,' i. e. the absence of perception, [arises] from non-arrival of the efficient manifestor of 'the object,' i. e. at the Sound.'

b. The import is as follows. Sound is eternal, (as we are constrained to admit) by force of the recognition that 'This is that same letter K' (—viz. the same Sound that I heard yesterday or fifty years ago), and I recognise it as I might recognise a peal of the perennial Hinsleyes which I do not suppose to cease to exist when I turn away my eyes from it,—], and in virtue of the law of parsimony [one of the fundamental laws of philosophising acknowledged by philosophers both of the East and of the West, and implying that we must never assume more causes of a given effect than are sufficient to account for it].

\* कर्म दृष्टि । कर्म । कर्मवा विश्वानामात्र । परं । पूर्व-  
परमार्थे । कर्म दृष्टिं । विश्वानामात्रः । संस्कृतुं अस्ति कर्म विश्व-  
प्रदीप्तमात्रान्वयमात्र ।

† कर्म दृष्टिः । कर्म दृष्टिं कर्मवा दृष्टि प्रसमित्प्राप्तात् ।  
कर्मवाच । कर्म दृष्टिः ।

† In opposition to the Mimankshas, the Nyayaikas contend that the form of expression 'This is that same letter K.' is grounded merely on the fact that the things referred to are of the same kind,—just as in the case with the ex-

## c. The conjunctions and disjunctions

*What prevents its being (—or unabsorbable)—of the air leaving always present,* from the mouth [of him who speaks or utters] remove the still air\* which was the obstacle to the perception of Sound, and thereby it becomes perceptible :—such is the reply to the objection [recorded in Aph. 7] of its ‘transitoriness.’

d. He next replies to the objection, [recorded in Aph. 8] that we use the expression ‘making’ [in regard to Sound].—

### प्रतीक्षय परम् ॥ १४ ॥

Aph. 14.—This [expression ‘making’]

*When we say we ‘make’ a sound, we ought to mean that there are [sound(s)] employing*

*we ‘employ’ a sound.*

a. In regard to Sound, when we

speak of ‘making,’ the word ‘making’ means, or imports, ‘employing,’ i. e. creating.)

passim. ‘He has taken the same medicine that I did.’ See the Buddhist Mahâvîra p. 155. Compare also the remarks of Whately on the ambiguity of the word ‘cause,’ quoted at p. 10 of our ‘Introduction to the Indian Philosophy.’

\* Europeans hold that Sound is due to vibration. Jolain admits that it is not perceived when there is no vibration, but he argues that the absence of vibration, or the silence of the air, is what prevents us from perceiving the sound which never ceases to exist, whether perceived or not.

† शुचोऽसायन्त्रेणविभावः अद्यपाप्रतिक्रम्यम्  
तत्त्वमित्याद्यन्तीकृत्वम् । ततः प्रतिक्रिया अस्तानादि-  
त्यस्त्रियस्त् ॥

‡ करोति शब्दाहित्यस्त्रियाद् ॥

§ प्रतिक्रम्य करोतीष्वन करोतिपद्मं प्रतीक्षय । उत्त-  
रस्य । परं । तात्पर्यस्त् ॥

3. He next replies to the objection (recorded in Aph. 9) that Sound is heard simultaneously by different individuals:<sup>4</sup>

### साधित्यवृत्तिशक्तम् ॥ ४ ॥ १

*As one sun is seen by men.* Aph. 15.—The simultaneousness is as up above, so it is heard simultaneously in the case of the sun.

3. 'As in the case of the sun!—that is to say,—as the Sun, which is but one, is seen simultaneously by those stationed in different places, so, like the sun, Sound is a great object, not a minute unit [such as cannot come at once under the inspection of persons at any distance from one another.]

3. He next replies to the objection (recorded in Aph. 10) respecting the original and altered forms of sounds:—

### प्रत्येकविभिन्नम् ॥ ५ ॥ १

*Letters are unchanged, not transposed.* Aph. 16.—This [via. the letter γ—transposed, referred to in Aph. 10—when it comes in the room of the letter ι] is another letter, not a modification [of that whose place it takes].

3. 'Another letter' i.e., That is to say,—in the room of the letter ι is another letter—another sound—a different sound in short. It is not a modification of the letter ι as a mat is a modification of the stones [out of which it is formed]. If it were so, then, as the maker of a mat is under the necessity of providing himself with stones, the man that employs the letter γ would be under the necessity of taking the letter ι; [to make the γ mat]

\* सप्ताहरे धारयन्ति विषयस्तीतिरात्रः ।

† सादित्यवृत्तिः । यथा एवः स्मृतो नानाहेतुश्चिन्त्यन्  
पद्मीकृते तथा साधित्यवृत्तान् जन्मते न प्राप्तं दाति भावः ॥

‡ प्रत्येकविभिन्नम् इत्यर्थाने वक्ता ॥ पर्याप्तः । सप्ताहरे

§ सर्वाल्परमिति इत्यर्थाने वक्ता ॥ पर्याप्तः । सप्ताहरे

of j—which is not the case, for one can use the letter j without any reference to the letter i].

3. He next replies to the objection [recorded in *Aph.* 11] that there is an augmentation\* [of the sound when the portions of it are increased].

### मात्रहिः परा ॥ १५ ॥

*Increase of noise and no increase of sound.* *Aph.* 17.—It is the increase of noise [not increase of sound] that is (in that case) augmented.

a. 'It is of noise,' etc. It is an error to say [as in *Aph.* 11] that it is an increase of sound that is 'augmented'—i. e. rendered greater.

b. 'Increase of noise.' From many busters of drums, or protractors of articulate sounds, it is recognised (by the human) that 'There is a great sound.' In such a case it is impossible, according to the opinion of our opponents [the Nityātyāins] to say that portions of Sound, being produced by each of the men [concerned in the making of the noise], produce a great bulk of Sound, like a bulk of cotton (formed out of portions of cotton aggregated), because Sound, according to those opponents, *unmeek* as it is a quality, has no parts [or portions].

अन्यतरम् चति वापत्। न चकारस्य विकारेणापानी करु  
दत्। तथा चति करुकर्ता विषयेण वापतम्भादवपत्  
वकारं प्रसुष्टचित्तमेनोकारमाहस्तादिति भावः।

\* हरिद्वेष्वलोचनसाक्षः ॥

† नाहहिः । परा । अतियथिता । मात्रहिरिति भूमि-  
विषया ॥

‡ नाहहिः । वद्मिल्लरीहहिः । वर्णालक्षणमुखात्-

c. Therefore,—as there is no *averting* [at an explanation otherwise],—when the conjunctions and disjunctions [occasioned by the vibration of the air] take place continually without intermission, arriving from all quarters at the entrance to the hollow of the ear, it [the Sound] seems to be great, and to be made up of parts. What is meant [in Apol. 17] by ‘noise’ is these conjunctions and disjunctions, and it is just of them that an amalgamation takes place\* [when a multitude of persons is engaged in rendering Sound manifest].

d. Having thus removed the objections offered by others, he proceeds to state what will establish his own theory:

नितयु चार्येन्द्रा वरार्पलाल । १८ ।

*Second circuit, also it would not stand for re-examination.*

यद्युक्तिं भवान् कन्द दृष्ट्युपत्तम्यते । तथा परस्ते प्रतिपुरुषं  
यद्युक्तिं भवान् कन्द दृष्ट्युपत्तम्यते । तूले भवत्त्वं चक्रे भवत्त्वं समाप्त-  
यतीति वज्रुमश्यत्वं । परस्ते यद्युक्तिं गुणत्वेन निरुक्तय-  
त्वात् ।

\* यसी दुर्लभा कर्त्तव्यकृतीमध्याम्भ स्वयंत्रार्थिं व्यापु-  
वहिः संयोगविभागेऽपि दक्षव्याप्ताकृत्युद्योगाच्चानिवाप्यव्या-  
निवच परीयते। संयोगविभागा नाहपदेश वाचासीयामेव  
हहिदिति भावः।

• यह वर्षानियादितदृष्टवाच्यता अनुवाद समाप्ति का एक प्रकल्प है।

c. 'Eternal'—i. e. sound must be eternal. Its 'eternalness'—i. e. its utterance—[thus denoted by the term] derives [from *avas* 'to see'] because Sound is perceived or becomes manifest thereby [i. e. by means of utterance]. 'Because for the sake of another'—i. e. because it is [available] to the end that another may understand one's meaning. If it were not eternal, then, as it would not continue till the hearer had understood our meaning (—the perceived sound ceasing on the instant that it reaches the ear—), the understanding [of what was uttered] would not take place because of the absence of the same—such is the import.<sup>2</sup> [The understanding of what is uttered must follow—at however short an interval—the perception of the sound uttered; and if the sound uttered perish on the hearing, then, being no longer in existence, it cannot be the cause of any thing. If, on the other hand, it continues to exist, for any period however short, after ceasing to be perceived,—it is impossible to assign any other instant at which there is any evidence of the discontinuance of its existence,—whereby its eternity is inferred.]

d. Moreover [as Sound is prospectively eternal, so was it, prospectively—for]—

### वाचं पृथग्वस्तुत् ॥ १६ ॥

*Sound is eternal, because heard  
only simultaneously recognises a  
sound, which causes therefore  
its own production.*

*Aph. 16.—[Sound is proved to be  
eternal] by there being everywhere  
simultaneousness [in the recognition  
of it by one so many hearers].*

\* विष्णु इति शब्दो निष्पत्तात्। इत्यते विष्णु शब्दो  
तुलेनेति वर्त्मनम् वाचात्। तस्य प्रार्थ्यतात्। वाचस्पार्थप्रति-  
पादयतात्। अनितत्वे चोत्तुर्थप्रतिपत्तिवर्त्मनात् तिष्ठतीति  
प्रतिपत्तिस्त्रीलं स्मात् कारणात्मावाविति भावः॥

+ विष्णु ॥

a. 'Every where?'—say in the word *go*, simply, [—a single example of a word born sufficeing as the representative of any or every word—]. 'By there being simultaneousness'—i. e. because there arises simultaneously [in the minds of a hundred or more persons, on hearing the word *go*—"a cow"]—a correct recognition. That "This [letter G, of the word *go*,] is that same letter G [that I have heard on an indefinite number of former occasions,]" is the recognition, simultaneously, of many persons; and a multitude of persons do not simultaneously fall into an error [—this being as unlikely as it is that a hundred arrows discharged simultaneously by a hundred archers should all by minute hit the same object—]; such is the import.\*

b. When the word *go* "cow" has been pronounced ten times, one says "The word *go* has been pronounced ten times" but not "Ten words of the form *go* have been pronounced;" and, he next declares that Sound is proved to be eternal by this fact also.†

### संखात्मकम् ॥ १० ॥

Sound is eternal, because each sound is not previously different from itself repeated.

AjA. 20.—[Sound is proved to be eternal] by the character of Number.

a. 'Of Number?—i. e. because Number [which belongs to that which, being transitory, is succeeded by another of the same kind,] does not belong to Sound [—for the word *go*, board ten

\* यानेवं गोशन्तुत्वाचे । योगपद्मान् । अवधिलक्षणे  
स्त्राणो युगपद्मान्तः । स यथार्थ गकार इति युगपद्मेष्वेष्ट  
प्रतिष्ठा भवति तस्मैके युगपद्माना भवतीति भावः ।

† तु शब्दादेव गोशन्तुस्त्रीवारप्य दृश्यारम्भरितो गोशन्  
प्रत्येक वर्तति ततु दृश्य गोशन्ता लक्ष्यात्तिं इति । अतोऽपि  
यद्वी नित्य दृश्यात् ।

Thus over, is just the same word *प्रय*—as remarked under Apk. 18. A.) This is plain.\*

3. And for the following reason too it is eternal, as he states it—

### स्वरूपस्तत्त्वात् ॥ १९ ॥

Sound is eternal because  
Indestructible.

Apk. 20.—[Sound is proved to be eternal]  
by there being no ground for anticipation  
[of its destruction].

a. That is to say, because we do not know any cause that should destroy Sound. To explain—*as*, on the mere inspection of a web, for instance, one feels certain that—"This web was produced by the conjunction of threads, and it will be destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction of the threads,"—*or*, from our having no such certainty as to any cause that should lead to the destruction of Sound, we conclude that it is eternal; [—on the same principle that the immortality of the Soul has been argued from its indestructibility].

b. But then (—some one may say—) "Sound is a modification of the air, since [—as you admit under Apk. 17.—] it

\* संस्थेति । चन्दे संख्याभावात् । स्फृष्टम् ।

† चन्दो द्रुषि निष्प तत्त्वात् ।

‡ चन्दनागकारणसात्त्वात्तत्त्वादित्यः । चन्दा पदादिद-  
शीनमात्रेण पट्टेश्चलन्तुस्येऽगच्छक्षात्तुस्येऽनमात्रादिगच्छ-  
तीति निष्पित्तेति तत्त्वा चन्दनागकारणनिष्पत्ताभावात्तिष्ठ-  
तीति भावः ।

arises from the conjunctions thereof [with the organ of hearing];—and so too the *Silivid* [—that appendix to the *Vedas* which treats of pronunciation—] tells us “Air arrives at the state of being Sound;”—and thus being a product of Air, it is not eternal.” This doubt having presented itself, he declares<sup>2</sup> as follows:—

### प्रतिस्पृशात् विषयः । ५५ ॥

Sound not due to  
Air, because not for-  
mable.

*Aph. 22.*—And [the case is not as the  
doubtless under *Aph. 21. 8.* suggests], because  
[if it were so] there would be no perception  
(by the organ of Hearing) of any object appropriate to it.

a. ‘Appropriate to it’—i. e. an object of the cognition that arises from the organ of Hearing—viz., Sound:—‘because there would be no perception’—i. e. by reason of our finding the object of any perception;—because modifications of the Air are not what the organ of Hearing takes cognizance of,—Sound not being something tangible [as the Air is held by the *Nāyikas* to be, while Sound they admit has an altogether different substantivity—viz., the Ether—]; such is the import.<sup>†</sup>

२ ननु गते वायुविकारः । तदीश्वरोऽस्मिन्दद्युम्नात् ।  
तथाच शिखा वायुरापद्मे वृक्षतात्तिं वायुस्तद्युम्नात्  
लित्र दद्याद्युम्नात्तात् ।

† ओर्थस्य । ओर्थेऽन्त्यजनन्यप्रत्यक्षिष्यते । शब्दस्य ।  
प्रत्याभावात् । प्रत्याभावायप्रसुप्त । वायुविकारस्य ओर्थे-  
न्त्यादाच्छुलात् । शब्दस्याप्यग्न्यात्तात्तिं वायुः ।

## विश्ववर्णनाय ॥ ५ ६ ॥

Sound is eternal, for the Ait. 26.—And [Sound is proved to be implied in Scripture] by our using a proof, [of this, in a text of the Scripture which will be cited in the commentary here following].

a. That is to say,—because we see a proof that language is eternal, in the following text—viz., "By language, that abides, eternal,"<sup>12</sup> &c.

b. And the truth is, that, although this declaration [—viz. the text just quoted—] was intended for another purpose [than to prove the eternity of Sound], still it does declare, incidentally, the eternity of language, and therefore Sound [without which it is impossible that language should be eternal] is eternal.<sup>†</sup>

c. Here ends the topic of Sound.]

## SECTION III.

On the Nature of Sounds, &c.

d. Through this Sound is eternal, as also the connection between Sound and sense, still, that no indication in the shape

... \* वाचा विश्वविनायेति सम्मे विषया वाचेति विश्ववर्णवादिवार्थः ।

† वस्त्रीदमन्तरं भावं सर्वापि वाचा विश्ववर्णवादिति वस्त्रादिवार्थः इति भावः ।

‡ वस्त्रादिवार्थं वस्त्राप्तम् ।

of a sentence is no proof of any thing's being a duty, he states [on behalf of an opponent, and therefore] basically as follows :—

सत्यात् च वचनः पुरुषाद्विभिर्विभिरः ॥ २४ ॥

Objection that though words may be eternally connected with their meanings, still this does not apply to sentences.

[The meaning—] is fictitious,—because the cause of [the knowledge of] the meaning [of the whole sentence] is not this [knowledge of the meanings of separate words].

a. "This being by nature"—i. e., the fact that knowledge of the meanings of words is natural [and "as short eternal"—see Apb. 3, d.—] being granted;—still the connections between sentences and the meanings of the sentences are 'fictitious';—i. e., not derived by man; because of its being 'not that,'—i. e., [because of its being] something different from the knowledge of the meanings of the words, that is the 'cause,' or producer, thereof,—is 'of the meaning,' i. e.—of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence.†

b. For [—to explain—], the sense of a sentence is not merely

\* एवं शब्दस्य ग्रन्थाद्वयमन्तर्बन्ध निष्कलेतुपि वाक्यात्मि  
का चेतना च अस्ति प्रत्याक्षमित्यात्मिति ।

† सत्यात्मिति । सत्यात् । पदार्थाद्वयात्मिति सत्य ।  
वाक्यात्मित्यात्मित्यात्मित्यात्मिति वचनाः । पुरुषाद्विभिरः । स्त्रीः ।  
पर्यायः । वाक्याद्वयात्मिति । वाक्यः । पदार्थाद्वयात्मित्यात्मिति ।  
निष्कलनः । वाक्यात् । वाक्यः । वाक्यात् ।

the [aggregate of the separate] sense of its words. There is [—we will admit—] a connection between a word and its sense [—a connection, as remarked under Apk. 5. c., is the shape of power, or of God's will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning—]; but it is not the fact that the connection between a collection of words is the shape of a sentence, and the sense of that sentence, is in like manner that of power [—or of God's having pre-arranged that such and such groups of words should convey such and such a sense]; but the connection is quite a different one, and it is devised by man, and is artificial: —how then can such be our evidence for [—or the cause of an absolutely correct knowledge of] Dute? Such is the import of the aphorism conveying the primal *fork* view.\*

c. He now declares the established view.†

तद्वाचमि शिष्यादेव समाप्तादेव गुरुं तद्विभिन्ना-  
तात् ॥ ८५ ॥

Apk. 25.—[In each *loka* of Scripture  
*Analysis of a*  
*Sentence.* there is seen] the meaning, along with a verb,  
of those [words] that are in it; because it is  
this (viz., the knowledge of the sense of the words—) that is

\* तद्विभिन्नादेव वाक्यादेवः । वदन्ति वदन्तेऽप्य वदन्ते  
सामाज्यवाक्या पदास्त्रैकप्रवाचनस्य वाक्यादेवं वदन्ते न वदन्ति-  
सामाज्यः विभिन्नादेव । वाक्यं पुरुषकल्पितः लक्षितः कर्त्ता  
पर्णि प्राप्तामिति पूर्ववदन्तेऽप्रभावात् ॥

† विभान्तमात् ॥

the producer of (the knowledge of) the meaning [of the sentence].

a. 'Of those that are in it';—i. e. of those several words that are extant in those [sentences]; 'along with what signifies action';—i. e., along with a term that expresses power [—in other words, along with a verb]; 'the meaning', i. e. the reading [or the employment] is observed, in [the terms which explain] the Agnivâra sacrifice, &c. Hence the knowledge of the sense of a sentence—[knowledge] which we had not before [hearing or reading it]—comes only from a collection of words which involve a verb;—'because it is this that is the producer';—i. e. because of the fact that 'this'—viz. the knowledge of the meaning of the words, is the producer', or cause, thereof."

b. To explain:—In the injunction "He that desireth Paradise should celebrate the Agnivâra sacrifice" (see Aph. 5. 5.), the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence—viz. that it is by the sacrifice called the Agnivâra that one may secure Paradise,—does not take place unless there be present the meaning of the words (—viz., the words Agnivâra and Paradise—); but the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence just consists in the knowledge of the mutual relation, consistently, of the meanings

\* तदूतमा॑ । सेषु लुप्तानी॑ पर्येकप्रह्लो॑ । शिरिषेन् ।  
यक्षिवाचिना॑ पदेन सह । समाप्तादः॑ । पहलं । हस्ते॑ ।  
विद्विषोचामैषु॑ । कारः॑ शिरिषाचक्षवद्विषितप्रदशमूर्ति॑  
वेष्टायूर्ध्वा विवर्यगच्छ । अर्थम् । वास्तविष्वानम् । तस्मि॑  
शिरिषाम् । तत् । पदार्थस्त्रान् । शिरिन् । कारम् वस्त्र ।  
ताम्भान् ।

that arises before us from the words;<sup>4</sup>—(so that if it be agreed that the meaning of the separate words is not dependent on man's contrivance, so neither is that of sentences formed out of such words)—and such additional difficulties as may seem to grow out of this view will be grappled with in the sequel).

### प्र॒ति प्र॒त्येकम् अथ॑वा गुणात् विवरणः व्याख्या ॥ ३ ॥

*As in earlier matters, as in Berry-  
town, the formation of sentences and  
expressions.*

Aph. 32.—Since, in [the same-  
language of] the world, there  
is a regular order,—(as in the  
Veda also) let there take place the employment [of language  
according to a fixed system to be learned through traditional  
instruction].

a. 'In the world'—i. e. in secular speech—having discerned what is meant by the word,—or, with a previous knowledge of what is meant by the word,—'since there is a regular order' i. e. since there is an employment [of words according to a fixed system,—even not deriving phrases expressed]—as in the Veda also, let there be—based on knowledge derived from the traditional instruction of teachers,—the 'occurrence'—i. e. the taking place—of an employment of language [according to a fixed system].†

\* कृपितोऽसुभूतान्मनैकाम इत्यत्र विद्विष्टोऽवनामक-  
द्वैतेभ्य शुर्गं यावेदिति वाक्यार्थानां न पदार्थापचित्ति-  
भन्नरा भवति विन्यु पदार्थापचित्तान्मनैकाम योग्यतया  
परस्परस्याभ्यन्मनैते वाक्यार्थान्मनैति भावः ।

† नोपके । वौकिकमन्दे । पदार्थं हट्टा पदार्थानपूर्वकं ।

Again he [the author] ironically states that this [the Veda] is no authority in regard to duty, because [henceforth] it is no longer valid, and it has been made by men, and men are liable to error.<sup>4</sup>

### वेदान्ते विष्णवं गुरुपात्रः ॥ ५ - १ ॥

*Objection to the validity of the Veda.* Aph. 37.—And the Vedas—  
that they contain the names of men—some declare to be something  
recent, [because] there are the names of men [in it].

a. "The Veda," i.e., i. e. since there are the names Kshathra, and Rama, etc., therefore it is "recent"—a matter of now—that is to say Aranya and a Beginning. "The Veda"—i. e. the scripture. "Recent"—i. e. the followers of the Nyaya. These [followers of the Nyaya] have asserted this,—such is the remainder (which requires to be supplied in order to complete the Aphorism).

विष्णवात् । प्रयोगात् । वेदेन्द्रियं गुरुपरम्परया चामपूर्वकः ।  
प्रयोगस्य विष्णवः । लापनिः । सात् ॥

\* वेदस्तानित्यात् । प्राक्षेत्रात् । एते ते इत्यात् पुरुष-  
द्वेषवान्यादिति पुराणात्तिवति ।

† वेदानिति । अतः पुरुषात्यात् । कारणो कौशलिति  
नामाति । अतः सचिकर्त्तृ । चामुनिकृ । चाहीनिकर्त्तृ ।  
वेदान् । चामुषात्यात् । एते । नैयायिकाः । चामुरिति  
चैषः ॥

a. And for the following reason also [—if we are to listen to such objections as the *Halphyllas*] it [the *Veda*] is un-*eternal*—as the author [ironically] states.<sup>4</sup>

### वर्णिताद्यनामः ॥ ५८ ॥

Objection to the *eternity* of the *Veda* that they make mention of persons who must necessarily have been born

*Aph. 58.*—Because of our seeing un-*eternal* persons (mentioned in the *Veda*).

a. "Un-*eternal*," i.e., Because, in such scriptures as "Babru, the son of Prakapji, desired,"—"Kurukshetra, the son of Uddhalihi, desired,"—we see mention of "un-*eternal* persons," i. e. of persons in whom belonged birth and death; and these sentences did not exist before the birth of these persons; so that the *un-*eternality** and the human origin [of the *Veda*] is established by the fact that it had a beginning. †

a. The author now mentions the established tract in regard to this.‡

### वर्णन् यद्युपेतम् ॥ ५९ ॥

The *eternity* of the  
*Veda* re-asserted.

*Aph. 59.*—But there has been declared [already] the priority of Sound (in any point in time).

\* वर्णिताद्यनामः ॥

† वर्णितैति । वर्णितानि । जननस्त्रयानि । चरण-  
प्राप्तिरकामयत् कुसुमिष्ट् वीर्याकिरज्ञानयत् दत्त्याहि-  
चेदेषु दर्शनात् । सेषाम्भग्नामपादिमानि वर्णानि लाल-  
हिति शरीराद्विषये धौषधेष्वलक्ष्यं मिहन् ।

‡ विद्वास्त्रयात् ॥

a. 'But there has been declared,' i.e. To supply the ellipsis,—the priority [to any point in time], i. e. the eternity, of Sound has been established. The eternity of Sound being established, the eternity of the Veda also is declared in the aphorism:—such is the meaning.\*

### वायुषत् प्रश्नानाम् ॥ ३० ॥

*One reader of the  
Veda comes to be known  
afterwards.*

Aph. 30.—The name [—derived from that of some mortal—was given, to this or that section of the Veda,] because of his reading it.

a. 'The name,'—i. e. the name of "the Kāshī section," [see Aph. 27. a.], or the like, is suitable 'because of his reading' or studying it,—the 'Kāshī section' being that which was performed by Kāshī.†

### परम् चुलिष्ठानाम् ॥ ३१ ॥

*What goes to be  
names of men, in the  
Veda, are really not*

Aph. 31.—But the terms in the text [which seem to be names of men] are common [to other objects, and do not there designate men].

Although there is the name "Babru" or "Pitrubṛgyā" [in the Veda,—see Aph. 38. a.], yet the text—the word 'Pitrubṛgyā' or the like—is 'common', i. e. expressive also of some other

\* कलमिति । यदे पूर्वते चिकित्सा साधिते प्रगिति  
गेत्यः । यदे चिकित्से मिहो वेदैरुपि चिकित्सा यदे कलमि-  
त्यत्पृष्ठः ॥

† वायुषा । वायुषादिचमाना । वायुचमान् । वायुचमान् ।  
कर्त्तव्याधीनं कालकलित्युपयषष्टा ॥

thing [than it may appear at first sight to denote]. For example—[in the word *Pṛthagṛī*] the prefix *pa* implies ‘comes,’—the word *ṛī* signifies ‘action,’—the final *i* represents the agent; and thus the word signifies the Wind which comes very fast, and this is without beginning; and (moreover) the word “*Balaṁ*” is a word indicative of the sound of the Wind,—so that there is not even a *susīt* of inconsistency.”\*

*Objection that the  
Vedic contains practices  
of their own.*

But then how can it be instrumental in producing right knowledge in regard to Duty, when the Veda contains such incoherent practices as the following—; viz. “*Jāṇḍava*, in cloth slippers, standing at the door, is singing benedictions—of his, a Brahmany woman, desirous of a son, espouse,—O Sir!—what is the meaning of that [which I hear you declaring] about intercession on days of fasting†?—or the following—viz. “The cows also attend this sacrifice”? To this he replies as follows:—

\* यद्यपि चरतः प्रावहिरिष्यति चरन्तु चुलिः प्रावह-  
यमादिगच्छ सामान्यं। चक्ष्यार्थस्तपि चाचकः। तथाच्चि-  
त्तेष्वस्त्रै चलापाचवा;। चक्षनश्चक्षनश्चितः। चक्षाः कर्त्ता;।  
तथाच्चोत्कृष्टगताच्चवा;। चासुपरस्त्राचानादिः। चरति चासु-  
शब्दानुकरणमिति चानुषपतिगम्योऽपि ।

† Or, according to another reading, “What is the meaning of *pa* as regards the position *Door*? ”

‡ चन्द्र चरहृष्टः कस्त्रापादुकांस्त्री द्वारि चिह्नो चायति  
मधुकारिणी ते चालुपांश्च दृश्यति चुचकाना राजकुमारी कम-  
नस्त्र कोरुर्ध्वति चायो वा एतत्त्वं ब्रह्माण्डो द्वारीनामवाम्भ-  
प्रत्यापानी वेदे चलान् कर्त्ता च भवेत् प्रसादमित्यचारम् ॥

सर्वे या विलिप्तेः स्मात् कर्मप्रसादम् ॥ ३५ ॥

Passages at first apparently  
meaningless, may be found, on  
scrutinization, to have a meaning.

ApA. 35.—It [—the expression  
just charged with being incoherent—] may have an application to the action,  
through its really standing in relation

to the action [which it serves suggestively to indicate as a duty].

a. 'To the action,' &c., —that is to say—*even such an expression* as "The cow also attend this sacrifice" [ApA. 31. 4],—  
"through its standing in relation"—i. e. through its really involving  
a mutual reference to—"the action"—i. e. the passage engaging  
some action,—has "an application"—i. e. through the penance  
(which it suggests as attending the performance of the action).

A. The import of the argument is this, viz.—Did the very hentes  
—the cows—engage in the sacrifice, or ought men to engage  
in its performance?—the listing of the *shakti* serves to com-  
municate [that duty which even things innocent would engage in  
if men neglected it—as we say, "The very stones would cry  
out" if men were to keep silence when under an imperative obliga-  
tion to speak, etc].

c. So much for the first section of the first Book of the  
commentary on the Aphorisms of Jaimini;

\* सर्वे चतुः । कर्मप्रसादम् कर्मप्रसादम् । सम-  
भात् । परम्यवाक्याभिनवात् । मातो या इत्यादीना-  
मपि । हने । कर्मप्रसाद विलिप्तेः ।

\* अथमात्यधः । मातोहनो तदा चपि कर्मप्रसादां चक्षुः  
विश्वास विद्वाच्च त्रिलक्ष्मियन संज्ञय चतुः चुती तात्पर्यं  
कुरुते चिति ।

\* चतुः विलिप्तेः चक्षुः परम्यवाक्याभिनवात् चयतः चाहः ।

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